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•A TIME OF STRUGGLE": EXOGENOUS SHOCKS,
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND CRISIS IN TANZANIA.
by Reginald Herbold Green*
But although our present problems are partly 
problems of development, the facts remain the same.
Our people do now expect to be able to have these 
very simple but important goods, and our economy 
is not at present making these available in sufficient 
quantities.
- J. K. Nyerere, 'Change is Innovation
And while we are making an effort to build our 
country we have to accept things as they are and 
start our journey from there...We cannot make changes 
in our country...by shutting our eyes to our current 
poverty and the problems which come out of...are 
indeed the meaning of that poverty. Nor can we 
build our country as if it was on...a planet by 
itself. We have to build Tanzania here in the world 
as it is, with all the world's problems.
- J. K. Nyerere, 'A Time of Struggle'.
* Professor Green has been a student of Tanzanian 
political economy since 1964. Over 1966-74 and during 
much of 1980 he was Economic Adviser or Consultant 
to the Tanzania Treasury. However, the opinions in this 
article are his personal responsibility and are not 
necessarily those of the Tanzania Treasury. Equally 
they reflect his present perceptions, not necessarily 
what he could see earlier.
1National Efforts and the International Setting 
To study the political economic structure, strategy 
or trajectory of any polity (especially a small, poor 
one) out of the context of the global political economic 
setting is to abstract from reality in a way which is 
likely to limit or vitiate the analysis. However, it 
is equally distorting to apply a global model without 
attention to the actual historic, social and political 
economic context and direction of a particular political 
economy.
In practice any single work must choose to emphasise
either the global or. the national - here the focus is on
Tanzania in the context of the New International Economic
3Disorder not on The World Economic Crisis and Tanzania. 
That choice requires no justification for Tanzanians - 
to them Tanzania is at the centre and what happens there 
and what they can do about it is of the utmost importance. 
For others it requires acceptance of two assumptions:
(a) Tanzania is of more than purely parochial interest;
(b) peripheral political economies do have some 
options and degrees of freedom - they are not totally 
governed by global/external pllitical economic 
relations and laws.
The volume of literature on Tanzania suggests that
2the first assumption is widely accepted. A polity
seeking to achieve structural change to meet basic human
needs out of a context of extreme poverty and relatively
low initial levels of social or political consciousness
through participation, self-reliance and transition to
socialism is of interest. That is independent of whether
one agrees with or dissents from the goals and/or the
means and whether one assesses the results as successful,
4problematic, flawed or disastrous.
The question of degrees of freedom is more vexed. There
is a case for arguing that the global political economy
determines everything significant on the periphery^ or
that economic laws preclude any significant transformation of
6economies ' like Tanzania in this century. Both views 
have had proponents in Tanzania but both are minority 
views there? if only because for Tanzanians to accept 
them, is in fact to embrace fatalism and accept
defeat in advance.
A more standard Tanzanian perception is that of the
7President:
I do not emphasise these (global context) things 
because they make our efforts useless. On the 
contrary...only if we... recognise our real situation 
in the world and what is happening in the world will 
we be able to understand the size of the task beiore 
us and use the strength we have to the best advantage.
3The Road from Arusha: 1967 - 1977
Tanzania's 'moderate1 image during the transition to 
independence and the first years- thereafter was always
Q
based at least partially on misinterpretation. However, 
the clear formulation of a strategy toward self 
reliance and socialism came in the 1967 Arusha Declaration 
and the 1971 Mwongozo (Guidelines).
9These and related decisions set out a strategy centered 
on:
(a) increasing the role of direct participation in 
decision taking and implementation?
(b) forbidding leaders (defined as party leaders plus 
senior civil servants and public enterprise managers 
and their spouses) from engaging directly or 
indirectly in private business;
(c) establishing public enterprise as the dominant 
mode of production - initially by nationalisation 
but primarily by investment;
(d) blocking the emergence of radical rural inequality 
and creating a participatory, partly communal village 
government/economic enterprise/social system as
a first step toward non-capitalist rural development;
reduction of inequality of income, access to 
public services and participation;
rapid progress toward universal provision of basic 
services - adult and primary education, basic prev- 
entitive and corrective medicine, pure water, 
agricultural information;
building up citizen personpower at middle and 
higher levels to reduce dependence on expatriates 
and to allow more rapid increases in productive 
forces;
organising strategy, planning and performance 
prirtarily on the basis of national efforts and 
resources with international solidarity as a 
secondary complementary?rather than a dominant 
organising, element;
achieving rates of growth of specific goods and 
services production and of overall productive . 
forces (seen as 6% a year) to achieve the basic 
aims by - say - the period 1990-2000.^°
creating appropriate and efficient party, 
government and public enterprise institutions to 
determine policy, plan and implement the development 
toward socialism and self reliance.
5Tanzania has never claimed to have achieved these goals -
albeit some rather unwary external enthusiasts have
claimed that on her behalf. However, significant
progress can be perceived in respect to most and perhaps
n  11all.
(á) Village and Workers Councils as well as Party
Branches are in many cases both democratic and
influential.
i
(b) the Leadership Code has in large measure been enforced - 
despite 50% real decreases in the incomes of most 
leaders as a result of nearly static salaries and 
rapid inflation;
(c) about 75% of large and medium scale economic activity 
is by public enterprises and most of the private 
activity is dominated by larger up or downstream 
public units;
(d) rural landholdings have become less unequal, food 
production (though not industrial/export crop 
production) has grown more rapidly, rural organisation 
and assertiveness have risen;
(e) from 50:1 at independence post income tax income
12differentials in the public sector were cut to 
about 7:1 by 1980; urban-rural inequality also was
6reduced over 1967-1977;^
(f) literacy has been raised to 70% (15% at independence)
rural access to pure water to 45-50% (versus 10%), ■
health facility visits to 10 per year (versus 2), 
universal primary education is achieved for the 
first three years and should be for six by 1983;
(g) high level citizen personnel have grown from 500
odd in 1961 to 5,000 in 1971 and about 19,000 in
1980 (expatriates 4,500, 5,000, 3,500) while
middle level technical, training enrolment (post
primary through tertiary) by 1980 exceeded 30,000
(under 500 at independence)?
%
(h) psychologically and in bargaining Tanzania is more 
self reliant. A wider array of products are
locally produced. But the ratio of imports to production
and of aid to investment have remained relatively
static and new activities tend intially to require
14expatriate staff;
(i) the average overall growth of productive forces 
has been between 4% and 5% a year and of food 
between 3^  and 4% a year - above average for Africa 
or for very poor economies but below the rate 
required for the strategy;
(j) the institutions are more appropriate, adequate
and numerous than in 1967. Most suffer from both 
staff shortages and newness and the range of
variation in appropriateness and efficiency is
u- u I5 very high.
The pace of change was in many respects faster than 
anticipated,but the total change needed to achieve 
either self reliance or socialism had clearly been 
underestimated.16 The basis for an exploitative system 
and the worst aspects of exploitation had been removed, 
but no serious claim that participatory socialist 
transformation had yet been achieved was - or could be - 
made. Similarly output and skills had risen but the economy 
remained fragile as well as poor and the pressures of 
growth and structural change clearly overstrained the 
public service and institutional structure.
Ill
Crisis and Response 1974-1977 ^
In 1973 and 1974 Tanzania suffered drought related 
losses of basic grain output of perhaps 15% and 30% 
(comparable to Sahel and Ethiopia). Between 1972 and 
1976 UNCTAD estimates showed a loss on terms of trade 
deterioration of about an eighth of GDP. The UN ranked 
Tanzania as the third r^ .ost severely effected state.
7
Tanzania formulated a national strategic response in
the first half of 1974. This involved: seeking to raise
production to close the supply/demand gap, improving rural/ 
urban terms of trade (especially for food), protecting the 
weakest groups (e.g., minimum wages, agricultural 
prices, drought relief), maintaining balance of the 
recurrent budget, limiting inflation via credit control and 
price management after adjusting to higher global oil 
and grain prices, seeking emergency external assistance 
to bridge an estimated three year gap before 
stabilisation reduced the shortfall of output (and 
import capacity) to that covered by normal aid 
programmes. This strategy was held to through 1977.
In retrospect it is almost too easy to cite it as a. text 
book case of successful stabilisation and recovery. After 
one bad growth year (19 74)^  output expanded at over 5% 
a year as did food production. After the 50% adjustment 
to new external prices^the cost of living increase rate 
fell to 8 to 10% a year. While not fully protected; 
minimum wage earners had limited falls in real purchasing 
power and peasants - after 1974 - had higher real 
incomes. No one starved. Implementation of the basic 
development strategy was continued. International 
interim funding (initially largely from the IMF as 
'emergency' aid turned out to have a 15-18 month lag 
from request to dispersal!) was secured and by 1977 
external reserves were at record levels.
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That view is too simple:
1. the success was a very near-run thing. At the end 
of 1974 reserves were exhaused, prices soaring, 
external finance hot forthcoming - strategic failure 
and literal starvation appeared to be months away;
2. the costs of dealing with the crisis were high -
in strains on insitutions and personnel, in 30 to 40% 
cuts in salary earners^ real purchasing power (their pre 
tax income range is £1,000 - £3,000), in deferred 
maintenance, in a worsening of the structural 
balance of payments gap;
3. the main manufacturing expansion programme ran 
behind schedule and the export development one never 
got off the ground;
4. the 1977 balance of payments breakthrough was the 
result of the coffee boom - satisfactory for the 
immediate purpose^but dangerous in concealing how 
seriously terms of trade shifts had eroded underlying 
import capacity and how badly overall export sector 
production was performing.
10
*No Worst There is None'
From 1977 through 1980 exogenous events have -
Tanzania a series of hammer blows in sum grea
181973-74 drought/oil crisis. Six have been r 
relative to the size of the economy:
1. 1977 - Collapse of the East African Commu.
entailing at least $100 million in replace
2. 1977/78 - Collapse of the coffee boom rer
earnings by up to $400 million a year;
3. 1978/81 - Amin invasion, support of Uganc
struggle, assistance to new Uganda govern: , 
about $500 million for the war and over ?. 
in support to Uganda;
4. 1979/80 - petroleum price esculation runn.'
$150 million per year by the end of 1980;
5. 1979 - flood damage to crops and - even me
transport facilities of the order of $100
6. 1979/80 - drought entailing probable crop 
excess of $100 million and an added 1980/S 
import bill of $50 million.
The total cost of these blows over 1977-81 con
$ 1,500 million. That is one third of 1979 Gross Domestic 
Product, four fifths annual government Recurrent Expenditure, 
one and a half times yearly fixed capital formation, 
twice annual export earnings. About $450 million fell 
in 1979, $520 million in 1980 and $350 million is 
projected for 1981. (In comparison ’the maximum year’s 
loss in the previous crisis - 1974 - was $200 million - say 
$350 million in current prices.)
Further damage has been done by the economic crises - 
again substantially exogenous - affecting Tanzania's 
neighbours. While in mid-1980 Tanzania had $250 million 
of trade payments arrears,it also had $325-350 million 
trade and service payments owed to it which could not be 
collected because of its debtors’ fiscal and/or foreign 
exchange problems.
Structural Gaps: The Weaknesses of Partial Success
19In ’Change is Innovation1, President Nyerere noted:
As a result of the actions of TANU, ASP and CCM and 
the actions of our government, our people no longer 
accept poverty and deprivation as the will of God.
Such dissatisfaction with poverty and deprivation 
is the first step overcoming poverty and backwardness 
if the way forward is open and the people understand 
how to proceed. The next step is a matter of 
leadership and organisation.
Broadly Tanzania's economy has advanced. The increased
sense of deprivation flows as much from increased levels
12
of consciousness as from, worsened objective conditions - 
especially in respect of public services and participation. 
Organisation has, in a majority of cases, been relevant 
and relatively effective; but the balance of effort has 
not always been optimal and glaring cases of irrelevance, 
ineffectiveness or a line of action pursued after 
its own success had made it counterproductive can be 
identified.
'In particular our foreign exchange earnings are
20insufficientr ..1 stressed the President in 1980.
Indeed so. In 1966 exports covered 105% of imports,
in 1973 80%, in 1978 44%, in 1979 and 1980 53%. While
loans and bridging finance rose, they did not close the
gap - especially in 1974-75 and after 1978 - and
carried risks of external policy intervention by
creditors, dramatically illustrated by the breakdown
21of the 1978-79 IMP negotiations.
Export strategy has been notable either for its 
absence (to 1972) or the lack of priority and resources 
allocated to it (until 1980). From 1971 warnings 
were made that without enhanced exports national 
policy would be delivered into the hands of external 
creditors. In 1972 the President stressed the need 
to process primary commodities before export to 
increase value added. In 1974 the stablisation and 
recovery strategy included export development and m
1975 the basic industrial strategy emphasised pre­
export processing. But articulation and action did 
not follow except in the case of processing units and 
many of these were rendered ineffective by primary 
production falls (e.g., cashew, pyrethrum) or 
marketing problems (e.g., sisal twine.)
Export quantities peaked in 1966 and thereafter tended 
downward at 1 - 2% a year. Only manufactured exports 
(notably textiles) rose significantly with an 
interruption in 1977 when the East African Community 
collapsed and a threatened choking-off in 1979-80 
from imported inputs and spares limitations. This 
compounded the 30% 1972-1979 worsening of Tanzania's 
terms of trade (briefly reversed during the coffee 
boom) to cut 1980 import capacity out of exports to 
less than two thirds that of 1973.
For somewhat different structural reasons,the fall in 
the overall import intensity of production was sluggish 
26% in 1966, 29% in 1973, 31% in 1975 (peak food 
imports after drought), 25% in 1980. In part this 
represents the much more rapid increase in import price 
than in the GDP deflater7but part of it reflects 
structural realities.
Food and manufactured consumer goods imports have 
been reduced over 1966-79 relative both to GDP and
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to total imports. The rise in fuel import ratios 
is totally exogenous. That in spares and intermediate 
goods reflects the growing importance of manufacturing 
and the growing complexity of the economy. Importing 
the final products would have required substantially more 
foreign exchange - and by the same token any cutback 
has a multiple effect on GDP and supply (Sh 1 off 
manufacturing sector imports costs Sh4 in local value 
added, Sh 5 in pre tax sectoral output, Sh 1.50 in tax 
revenue.) The sharpest increase is in capital goods 
because the direct and indirect import content of 
fixed investment remains about two thirds (partly 
because of an intersectoral shift from construction 
toward machinery and equipment) while the share of 
investment in GDP has risen. The slow implementation 
of 1974-76 industrial plants (most coming on stream 
in 1979-82 versus 1976-78 plans) has worsened the 
relative failure of quite real import substitution to 
hold down the absolute level of imports required.
Agricultural development has been at one and the 
same time the most successful and problem-ridden 
sector over 1967-80. Food output has risen 3^ 5% a 
year (above 5% over 1974-79) but inadequately 
detailed strategy has meant growing gaps (imports 
or shortages) in respect to five key foods: rice,
wheat, milk, sugar and oilseeds. Higher prices have
improved rural/urban terms of trade but inadequately 
worked out relative prices (and an utterly incoherent 
set of advice from the technocratic Marketing 
Development Bureau which succeeded the relatively 
less random administrative/political Agricultural 
Price Co-ordination Committee) have led to unsound shifts 
between crops producing unmanageable surplus of 'famine 
crops' and declines in key exports.
Unfortunately 'experiments' with central silos and 
tarpaulins as storage cure-alls - versus plugging 
ahead with village and reqional warehouses - has led 
to 300,000 tonnes of maize rotting or being put into 
poultry feed and exports to avert loss over 1977-79.
As 1980-81 imports will be about 200,000 tonnes the 
moral is clear - - * maize production is in hand,
storage is not. Similarly the National Milling 
Corporation procured and distributed (albeit at high 
cost) food much more effectively than its predecessors. 
But its expansion (especially in the peak 1978 harvest 
year and with the lack of storage) led to near total 
loss of physical and financial control and a 1976-1980 
loss of $250 million (equivalent to 20% of a year's 
government recurrent expenditure or to the normal annual 
surplus of the public enterprise sector.) Basically the 
1975 'Grow Food or Starve' crisis strategy centered 
on maize and'famine crop^production, procurement and 
distribution far too long after it had succeeded and
therefore failed to stress coherent relative prices, 
articulated production targets and efficiency in physical 
and financial control.
The 1974-75 Villageisation preserved the possibility 
of continued rural advance. It was consistent with rapid 
increases in production and with substantially■increased 
local initiative and communal investment. However, 
it merely made possible better production methods - 
a possibility not yet achieved - and in some cases 
created substantial ecological problems requiring 
land use changes - not yet fully worked out or 
implemented. Villagers are better off in a majority of 
cases than the scattered peasant homesteads of 1973 - 
vide the tendency to shift from plantation jobs to 
own plot self employment. But the production and land 
management aspects have yet to be tackled coherently.
The greater stress on structural weaknesses - and later 
on tactical mistakes - than on external shocks is not 
to imply that the former played a larger part in creating 
the crisis nor that under 1973 or 1977 conditions 
they could not have been resolved over a moderately
extended period. The President struck the balance when
, 22 he sard:
It is true that our inefficiency has made things 
worse...but all (non oil exporting peripheral 
economies) are suffering from such serious deficits 
in their foreign exchange balance that they can
18
not any longer import goods essential to their 
economic well being.
The point is that while Tanzania remains committed 
to a 'new round of negotiations' for a 'new international 
economic order' it can do little to hasten such change 
nor expect much payoff in the next few years. Its 
own structural weaknesses'are, potentially, more 
subject to correction by Tanzanian initiatives and 
efforts.
Facile Descensus Avernum: 1977-79
The external shocks and structural weaknesses both 
contributed to and were exacerbated in their impact 
by a series of tactical failures over 1977-79:
(a) the 1977-79 Budgets were at best imprudent - 
a break with the 1961-76 record of fiscal 
austerity;
(b) credit and import control weakened and 
significant excess credit creation (NMC and 
government deficit) and external arrears
(primarily from export licensing in excess of the 
foreign exchange budget) were allowed;
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(c) the NMC was allowed to continue its rake's progress' 
unchecked until.late 1979 despite very plain evidence 
from mid 1978 that something was seriously wrong;
(d) economic management (and especially export development) 
did not regain top priority status which it had
held over 1974-76.
The laxity in 1977 related partly to tiredness from the
1974-76 struggle and partly to euphoria from the coffee 
boom. In 1978 the slowness of response is harder to 
justify. From late 1978 through mid 1979 the Amin 
invasion had placed Tanzania on a war footing - and given 
Amin's military forces and external supporters - in 
real peril of survival. Under those circumstances lack 
of adequate attention to economic management is not 
surprising - a struggle for survival 'an the military 
front must take priority.
Nonetheless the results of the external blows, 
structural weaknesses and tactical failures were no 
less severe because they were beyond Tanzania's control 
or fairly readily explicable:
(a) a total collapse of the external balance
with uncontrolled balooning of arrears and 
import cutbacks threatening economic chaos;
(b) endemic shortages of many basic goods (especially 
upcountry) and an upsurge in black marketing and 
of a manager - private subwholesaler - retailer 
corruption channel that threatened both price 
management and public morality;
(c) massive imbalance on the Recurrent Budget (always 
previously in small to moderate surplus but over 
$275 million in the red in 1978-79 and about $150 
million in the red for the first half of 1979-80) ?
(d) an NMC loss almost equal to the surplus of the 
rest of the public enterprise sector;
(e) explosive increases in cost of living increases 
from the 8 to 10% typical of mid-1974 to early 
1979 to perhaps 25% annual rate at the end of 1979.
Collapse appeared to be in full sight. The breaking 
off of the IMF negotiations in rejection of proposals 
for devaluation, abandoning foreign exchange - credit - 
price planning, social service cuts and real wage decreases 
and the related resignation of the Minister of Finance 
looked from abroad more like a last gesture of defiance 
than the basis for a new effort.
The Uphill Road Back
President Nyerere made two major addresses, one 
outlining the grim economic situation and immediate 
prospects, the other - a New Year's talk to the 
diplomatic corps — castigating the IMF for arrogant, 
politically motivated intervention beyond its proper 
brief. Economic management was restored to top priority 
and the new (third term) Finance Minister was soon 
flanked by a new Minister of Planning and a new Minister 
of Commerce. While all would normally be categorised 
as in the left or left centre of CCM,their dominant 
common characteristics are economic expertise, 
intelligence, diligence and an abiding belief that 
Tanzania's strategy can be made to work but only if 
adequate attention is paid both to forward planning and 
to overseeing effective implementation.
The first few months were a hectic attempt to keep the 
external finances afloat - without IMF funding - 
to restore fiscal control, to begin rationalisation of 
NMC and to assess what could be done in the medium 
term. Until March the economy continued to sag even 
though import allocations became more rational as of 
'January, the hemorrhage in the recurrent budget began to 
come under control at about the same time and price 
alterations reduced the NMC deficit flow. Shortages 
worsened, manufacturing output (and with it revenue)
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fell 25% and initial public optimism became rather
threadbare. However a basis for at least stabilisation
and perhaps a turnaround had been laid:
(a) the Recurrent Budget deficit for 1979/80 had been 
held to $225 million and the 1980/81 Budget estimates 
backed by tighter revenue and expenditure proposals 
provided for a reduction to below $50 million;
(b) credit and foreign exchange budgeting had been 
refurbished and were working more effectively - 
albeit at the cost of a severe late 1980 credit squeeze
(c) the decision to decentralise NMC (roughly along
the lines of the successful 1971-74 restructuring
2 3of the state trading sector ) had been taken and 
a working party to articulate it created;
(d) food imports and distribution to ensure that the 
record of no deaths from starvation was maintained 
had been organised and initial steps to correct 
irrationalities in relative grower prices for 
different crops taken;
(e) a three year interim programme - including export 
development - had been drawn up;
(j-) external balance of payments support finance of
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$90 million was received in 1979/80 (vs $20 
million in 1978/79) and $150 million odd pledged for 
1980/81 in addition to substantial IDA and World
v
Bank programme loans;
; (g) the renewed IMF negotiations had produced a two
year Standby Agreement of about $280 million (about 
$155 million in 1980/81) without devaluation, 
abandonment of price - credit - foreign exchange 
planning, social service cuts and with a 26% (36% 
rural)-minimum wage increase.^
(h) structural adjustment credit negotiations with the 
World Bank had yet to produce finance but had 
been useful in articulating three year priorities 
and sequences for use in national planning and 
offered hope of up to $250 million Bank finance 
beginning in 1981.
VIII
An Interim Balance Sheet
What can be said not of intentions or efforts but of 
results by the end of 1980?
Tanzania's economy and society - and also its political 
economic strategy - have survived, a by no means trivial 
achievement and one that seemed unattainable a year
4earlier. But the underlying crisis persists.
The foreign exchange gap has been contained, barring 
new shocks arrears have peaked, allocations are more 
rationally planned. But the economy is still starved 
of necessary imported inputs which cannot be financed.
Manufacturing output has been pushed up a third from 
March 1980 levels and should rise in 1981. But 
shortages continue and 1981 will at best marginally 
exceed 1978 levels.
Shortages of basic goods are contained at irritating, 
time-wasting levels; price management continues to 
function for the bulk of most products. (That the 
Tanzania shilling is at a premium on the black markets 
of six of its eight neighbours is evidence that 
Tanzania's problems are neither unique nor uniquely bad.) 
But - except for food--- shortages are still as severe 
as in the 1975 trough.
Inflation, while at lower rates than at least six of 
eight neighbours, is still of the order of 20%,
Basic public services - especially water, health, 
education - are steadily being extended. But maintenance 
and operating (e.g., drugs, books, fuel, chalk) budgets
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4are squeezed reducing quality and useability.
Violence and - probably - corruption have been reduced.
But both remain at levels above 197 8 and a fortiori 19 73.'
Minimum wage and grower price increases have limited real 
income decreases for the weakest social groups - indeed 
with good weather most peasant real incomes should 
rise in 1981. But they have yet to reverse them and 
the vertigenous fall in salary earners1
purchase power gives cause for alarm in terms of future 
morale and morality.
Economic planning and both government and public enterprise 
management has received renewed attention and is, in 
general, substantially better than in 1978-79. In some 
cases it is at new highs. But much - especially at 
middle level - remains unacceptabiy poor and the NMC/
Food Sector reorganisation has yet be to achieved.
The explosive rise of specialised middle level technical 
institutions to over 200 with over 25,000 students (more 
than the mainline secondary system) gives valid 
hopes of breaking the middle level personpower bottleneck 
by 1985. But the present structure is chaotic and - 
more critical - major gaps (e.g. book-keeping and 
accounting) remain.
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Morale is ultimately at least as critical to results 
as analysis. Tanzanian urban morale was very low in 
late 1979. Rural, somewhat surprisingly was better, 
perhaps because of better 1973-78 real income trends.
While morale appeared to improve markedly from mid- 
1.980 onward - at levels from the President's addresses 
and the budget speeches to office, shopfloor, bus, bar 
and store conversation-weariness of crises and a sense 
of loss of part of what had been won remains. While 
cynicism and indifference are below 1979 levels and 
by no means dominant,they are not uncommon.
But that is not the whole picture. There are many
officials and managers who work late, seek to improve
performance, become passionately angry at incompetence
or corruption. There are spontaneous forward
initiatives. For example the National Board of Accountan
and Auditors hold a seminar on financial disclosure.
Participation, performance and accountability (including
to workers and the public) were its themes. Three
hundred pages of rather good papers (for no fees) were
secured and 200 senior auditors and accountants
25participated - most actively.
The 1980 elections were seen as a vote of confidence 
(or no confidence). 80% of the estimated electorate
registered, 70% voted, an average of 30 candidates
sought each seat. The President was re-elected by
93% (down from 94%). The five major economic
ministers standing were returned with comfortable
margins. This scarcely suggests apathy, despair or
2 6basic rejection of the 1979-80 clawback efforts.
That view is reinforced because over half of backbench 
MPs (as well as one minister) were defeated. Voters 
had choices and voted (as many Tanzanians speak) against 
what they perceived as substantial middle level muddle 
and ineffectiveness.
Strategy and Management: U Turn or Consolidation?
Tanzania's abandonment of its strategy of transformation 
has been predicted - and/or seen to be happening - with 
great regularity from 1967 onward. 1980 has been no 
exception with (gleeful) right critics, (despondent) 
liberal sympathizers and (bitter) left critics all seeing 
a drift to pragmatic, dependent capitalism.
The case is not convincing. Progress has been limited 
but the lines followed have not changed^nor do the 
major budget and Presidential addresses nor the Election 
Manifesto suggest they are about to be altered.
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The battle with the IMF shows the continued priority 
on foreign exchange - credit - price management as central 
planning instruments. The minimum wage and grower 
price increases indicate the continued priority of 
egalitarianism. So do the continued concentration on 
basic health, education and water in the budget.
Whatever practical criticisms may be made of new 
commerce regulations, virtually extinguishing private 
wholesaling and importing is hardly pragmatic capitalism.
Supposed evidence of 'privateisation' is, in general,
flimsy. Few Ujamaa villages had substantial communal
crop production - Development Village communal
commerce, production (transport, manufacturing) and
construction (roads, irrigation, wells, housing, public
buildings) has risen markedly. The apparent rise in
private investment is largely a statistical deterioration.
2 7as 'errors and omissions' are lumped with it.
Negotiations for joint ventures with (counting taxes)
80% - 20% surplus division in Tanzania's favour in 
natural gas manufacture and mineral development is
evidence of a continued state of dependence but hardly
2 8of passive acceptance of it.
Regionally Tanzania has not resiled from the often 
onerous burdens of support for liberation and regionalism. 
The end of Amin, the negotiations leading to the
29
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independence of Zimbabwe, the continued Front Line 
States Chairmanship of President Nyerere, involvement 
in Kagera Basin and Southern African Development 
Co-ordination efforts and acceptance of huge unpaid 
arrears by neighbours suggest quite the reverse.
Two changes are evident. Export development has been given 
29priority. Better economic management has returned to
the centre of attention.'"0 „ . . ,But the context has been
’exports for self-reliance1, and efficiency to preserve
the transition to socialism, egalitarianism and participation
The evidence is not of a U turn nor even of a shift to
cautious pragmatism. Economic management and exports
have been stressed as the means to overcome what
are perceived as obstacles to^and contradictions
within^the present strategy and to permit continued
advance within it.
Immediate Prospects: External and Domestic
Neither a collapse of the Tanzanian economy^ nor of the 
social cohesion and determination represented in the 
election results and in the President's speeches, in 
1981 appears likely. Neither does a return to the 
relatively favourable internal and external conjunctures 
of 1972 and 1977.
30
To project 1981 is in large part to guess the impact 
of the Gulf war on petroleum prices and supply, to 
forecast the response to the Brandt Report and the 
course of OECD states infatuation with joint
maximisation of unemployment and inflation, to prognosticate 
on the weather. Any one of these could have major positive 
or negative impact, on none is it reasonable to pretend 
to great accuracy nor great optimism.
Fiscally and managerially Tanzania is on a much 
stinger base than a year ago. A coherent medium term 
strategy exists for most sectors, parts of one are being 
articulated for agriculture. Barring a third 
consecutive year of sub-average weather^ output should 
rise in 1981 allowing some increase in real consumption, 
continued protection of low income purchasing power 
and perhaps some alleviation of the sustained slashes 
in upper wage and salary purchasing power.
However, there is no evident solution to the basic 
foreign exchange constraint. In 1981 it will be loosened 
if - and only if - the World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Credit and the 1981-82 tranche of the IMF Standby are 
secured. Even then7it will not be removed even for 1981-82 
nor will the respite be lasting unless and until a 5 to 7% 
annual growth trend in real exports replaces the 
1965-67 onward 1 to 2% decline.
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What has been achieved - at great cost and strain - 
over 1979-80 is four fold:
(a) prevention of economic collapse or social 
disintegration;
(b) re-establishment of belief that the crisis can 
be surmounted;
(c) better management and interim tactics to sustain 
the economy and strategy at least for 1981;
(d) time to reassess the basic structural and 
strategic problems confronting Tanzania domestically, 
regionally and in the context of the probable 
intensification of the New International Economic 
Disorder.
What Is To -Be Done?
In terms of domestic results7Tanzania1s strategy - 
while hardly free from secondary contradictions - has proven 
viable. Adaptation rather than radical reformulation 
would seem appropriate. The pattern of sequential 
emphasis on a limited number of problems at a time to 
achieve structural change - e.g., 1967-68 nationalisations, 
1970-72 workers councils, 1977-80 universal primary
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education - followed by incremental efficiency 
improvement after the breakthrough and a shift of 
priorities to a new area has worked well in terms of 
avoiding dissipation of energy and of achieving clearly 
defined priorities.
However, in the context of the post 1973 - and especially 
of the 1979 - ?? - phase of the New International
Economic Disorder^ the strategy as practised may no longer 
be viable. Tanzania's freedom to continue it depends 
on an ability to reconcile the strategy with external 
necessity, otherwise the structural foreign exchange 
gap will behave like an astronomer's black hole.
The outlook for international co-operation makes this
reality even more stark. The head of a sympathetic aid
agency, who knows Tanzania well suggested that the
•3/1existing approach would not be viable much longer.
He pointed to stagnation of global aid flows and 
worsening terms of trade as evidence that Tanzania 
could neither place the same emphasis on expansion of 
public services nor use as high a level of foreign inputs 
Both greater emphasis on physical production and on 
lowering the cost of basic health, water and education 
seemed to him critical.
President Nyerere's perception in his parliamentary
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and party addresses was similar. Increased production, 
enhanced exports, more innovative use of local instead 
of imported materials and of ’intermediate1 (e.g. 
manure, straw, ox ploughs) technological advances 
were stressed. While citing the need and struggle for 
NIEO, he held out little hope that it could be achieved 
in the time frame relevant to overcoming the present 
crisis. Adapting to the NIED - by linking more production 
to external markets and delinking more inputs from them - 
was the theme not adopting the NIED to suit Tanzania.
Six strategic elements require reconsideration in the
new context: the transformation (foreign exchange)
problem, rural development, industry, participation,
33distribution and collective self reliance.
The most antagonistic contradiction today is the
transformation problem. Tanzania cannot feel secure
until exports cover at least 75% of imports with
imports at levels consistent with full operation of the
economy. That is a long way from 53% at austerity import
levels and requires a trend reversal. Autarchy is
impractical in a small economy, capital goods production
on a substantial scale is implausible before the 1990s
and unless oil is discovered transport is necessarily
powered by imports. In July President Nyerere stated 
34that Tanzania:
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will have to take steps to increase the sale of our 
goods abroad...If it is necessary to sell Khanga 
or Vitenge or soap or other things we would like 
to use ourselves, we will have to sell them. It is 
strange but true that one way to end the shortage 
of goods which now upsets our people is to sell 
some of these goods abroad...to plant the seed you 
have rather than eating it. To tighten your belt 
today is to eat tomorrow. Those who eat the 
seed-corn are foolish and shortsighted, in the 
end they become beggars. When we decide to export 
some of our goods now it is because we are seeking 
a means of becoming more self-reliant. We are planting 
our seed instead of eating it.
The elements of a strategic reformulation exist:
(a) restoration and/or enhancement of most agricultural 
exports (coffee, sisal, cashew, pyrethrum seed 
beans, cocoa, tea, tobacco) and selective 
development of new ones (e.g. soya beans, maize, 
sugar);
(b) systematic exploitation of pre-export processing 
(sisal twine, cashew kernels, leather and shoes, 
textiles and garments) improving use of plant 
capacity-and building up adequate marketing 
competence;
(c) systematic promotion of manufactured exports
initially based on existing excess capacity which 
renders export sales of some (e.g., textiles, tyres, 
corrugated sheet, batteries) regionally or 
internationally competitive and profitable to the
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producers. Capacity, market, cost and promotion 
identification as well as imported input allocations 
require intensive study and action;
(d) pushing ahead with mineral development beginning with 
the (very small) 1981 and 1983 gold mines, exploiting 
the natural gas for large scale fertilizer exports and 
seeking to develop the iron ore/vanadium, Uraniuiji, nickel/ 
cobalt and coal deposits. However, while this may
be the 1990-2000 ’solution* to the transformation problan 
it can yield relatively little before the late 1980s;
(e) pursuing an import substitution policy in energy.
Marginally this is feasible by substitution of hydro
for diesel electricity generation, coal for oil in
manufacturing furnaces and using ethanol from molasses
as a gasoline mix. Whether a breakthrough is possible
turns on the results of- further oil exploration - unprojectable
35as to result or timing.
Rural development requires rethinking because the past 
strategy’s successes have rendered it obsolete and its 
weakness on export generation and on clearing the remaining 
five food import items (rice, wheat, sugar - if demand were 
fully met, milk and oilseeds) are a large part of the 
transformation problem.
Together with storage and relative price issues these provide
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an agenda for an articulated 1981-1985 programme of 
action which is a further step rather than a reversal. 
Rather more complex problems arise in respect of 
agricultural practices and inputs, soil conservation 
and developing renewable energy sources (presumptively 
village woodlots but possibly also windmills and methane 
from manure). The barriers seem more technical than 
ideological and managerial/educational than structural/ 
financial but are nonetheless urgent and difficult to 
tackle.
3 6Industry is in a somewhat different position. The 
basic industry strategy still appears sound. The 40% 
rate of capacity utilisation seems to be dominantly the 
result of import and middle level technical personnel 
constraints. A related problem is the delayed bunched 
construction of plants which when complete could reduce 
total imports by a net 6 to 8%.(at current GDP levels). 
Productivity is unsatisfactory but better import supply, 
more exports (to finance the fo.rmer) , completion of 
'in the pipeline' plants as a matter of urgency, 
sorting out water and power bottlenecks, speeding and 
rationalising the burgeoning stream of middle level 
technical training seem the key correctives not worrying 
about worker laziness or indiscipline nor overall 
managerial weakness (even though all exist in specific 
cases). Again this is a technical and managerial more 
than a structural and ideological programme. However,
there is an ideological issue - working conditions and 
management attitudes in some (not all) enterprises 
remain abysmal - strengthening Workers Councils and 
workplace party branches in these is imperative even 
on narrow production grounds.
Participation is critical for ideological reasons. However, 
the current imperative for new advances is production 
oriented:
the development of Tanzania will come from the 
decisions of Village and Urban governments and 
from thousands of local groups which decide to 
help themselves in development and take the 
actions necessary to do so. 38
These groups are responsible for small scale public 
sector production - at the moment the weakest area - 
and for small scale communal investment - growing 
relatively rapidly. Scattered results in small scale 
transport, industry and infrastructure suggest more 
encouragement to act (the freedom to act exists), more 
backing vis a vis officials (who often tend to inertia) 
and more demand oriented provision of supporting 
services is required.
Tanzania’s stability has rested on two broadly held 
beliefs: that Tanzanias could achieve something by
acting together and that the Party and State belonged 
to the people. Participation needs therefore to be
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enhanced rather than reduced in a period of crisis 
to demonstrate the objective validity of these beliefs.
Distribution poses very acute problems. Until real 
resources available for consumption rise steadily at 
least 5% a year,advances in public consumption, sustaining 
peasant and minimum wage earner real incomes and 
avoiding real falls in salary earner purchasing power 
are not mutually compatible. The rate of increasei
over 1972-1979 (adjusted for terms of trade deterioration) 
was under 3%.
In the medium term,the only solution is to raise 
production growth to 5-6% a year (again after adjustment 
for terms of trade deterioration). Until that is 
achieved other constraints apply:
(a) the basic service trio - primary health, pure 
water, basic education-must continue to have 
priority, at the expense of desirable but less 
critical services, e.g., rural electrification;
(b) housing development must be reconstructed to 
provide inputs for village, neighbourhood or 
'informal sector' building using largely local 
materials, skills and labour. Any other route 
quadruples costs. (Previous attempts in this
40
direction have tended to relapse back to technically 
sound but financially prohibitive neo-traditional 
approaches.);
(c) minimum wage (which de facto sets the informal sector 
range of incomes in a cluster around it) and peasant 
income protection must retain pride of place on the 
personal consumption planning side;
(d) but the fall of real incomes of salary earners must
be halted or at the least slowed by scale or tax
changes which at the least (as in 1974) demonstrate that
the Party and government appreciate these sub-classes*
39very real problems.
Collective self reliance in terms of what Tanzania can
do by itself is basically a regional issue. Tanzania remains
committed to the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77 -
'The strength of a small country like ours lies in being
40part of a group with other small countries...' It is 
also committed to the OAU* s new phased ■ initiat ives toward 
continental African economic co-ordination. But where 
Tanzania's actions can be crucial is in the context of 
Eastern and Southern Africa.
These topics did comprise about a quarter of the President's
41Parliamentary Address. They are part of a continuous
Tanzanian concern with concrete regionalism building
on common interests and grounded in ongoing programmes —
a theme emphasised by the President at the Lagos OAu
Summit where he pointed to the necessity of prior
regional groupings as the building blocks for continental
coordination. Rethinking now arises from one disaster -
42the 1977 collapse of the East African Community - and 
two opportunities - the liberation of Uganda and Zimbabwe*.
Two focuses now exist
(a) the Kagera Basin Authority (Rwanda, Burundi,
Uganda, Tanzania) covering transport, power, 
communications and - perhaps - irrigation. Its . 
development' would be greatly enhanced by a stable 
Uganda government as the historic context of Kenya- 
Uganda relations and especially of Kenya's last 
ditch support for Amin has made Ugandans very 
committed to building alternative trade and transport 
links to complement the 'Kenyan connection';
(b) the Southern African Development Coordination 
(Lusaka Declaration) group of Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania focused on 'Economic liberation' 
via regional co-ordination for development. While 
the immediate priority common interest is 
complementing political liberation with breaking
concentrated dependence on South Africa, this is
seen as requiring broad joint action from*transport
through food security and control of foot and
mouth disease to harmonisation of industrial
production and trade (the last the area delegated
to Tanzania to co-ordinate articulation of an
44action programme).
Between them these two groups could evolve into 
coherent economic regionalism. Both are avoiding the 
standard errors of importing models and rushing into 
action before analysis. But both are still at the stage 
when patient programme articulation and development are 
necessary for several years to establish a viable dynamic 
based on substantial net benefits to each participant.
Can adequate strategic reformulation in these areas be 
developed in time and to a degree adequate to assure the 
survival of Tanzania's 1967-1980 trajectory? The 
answer must be problematic. The difficulties are 
immense - the transformation problem is clearly being 
tackled later than it should have been and the 
international context is highly unfavourable (except 
regionally).
On the other hand in 1967 (The Arusha Declaration 
beginning), 1974 (the drought/oil crisis), 1979 (the
apparent emergency of domestic economic collapse and 
international default) survival of Tanzania 
looked even more problematic (indeed hopeless even 
to some sympathetic observers, particularly in 1979). 
Tanzania has proven more resilient and innovative 
than any normal objective analysis would suggest was 
possible. It would be highly premature to write off 
questions as to present Tanzanian options and 
necessities on the basis that collapse was 
inevitable.
For Tanzanians and sympathetic observers the best 
prescription still appears to be pessimism of the 
intellect - tempered by the historic record of 
challenges met - and optimism of the will - chastened by 
recognition of how hard the road ahead is.
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